Paralyses` by Culbert, John
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
University of Nebraska Press -- Sample Books 
and Chapters University of Nebraska Press 
Fall 2010 
Paralyses` 
John Culbert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons 
Culbert, John, "Paralyses`" (2010). University of Nebraska Press -- Sample Books and Chapters. 38. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples/38 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Nebraska Press at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Nebraska Press 
-- Sample Books and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
P a r a l y s e s
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
Pa r a l y s e s
literature, Travel, and ethnography  
in French Modernity | John Culbert
u n i v e r s i t y  o f  n e b r a s k a  p r e s s  |  l i n c o l n  a n d  l o n d o n
Buy the Book
© 2010 by the  
Board of regents of the 
University of Nebraska
all rights reserved
Manufactured in the  
United states of america
This book has been published  
with the support of a grant from  
scripps College.
Portions of the introduction and chapter 1, 
“The Muse of Paralysis,” were originally pub-
lished as “Border Crossings/Crossing Bor-
ders: Paralyses of Travel in literature and 
anthropology” in Western Humanities Review 
60, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 117–27. Chapter 3, “slow 
Progress: Jean Paulhan and Madagascar,” was 
originally published in October 83 (Winter 
1998): 71–95. Portions of chapter 6, “The Wake 
of Ulysses,” were originally published as 
“Haunting the Métropole” in Formules 14 
(spring 2010).
library of Congress  
Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
 
Culbert, John.
Paralyses: literature, travel, and ethnography 
in French modernity / John Culbert. 
p. cm. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
isbn 978-0-8032-2991-4 (cloth: alk. paper) 
1. Travel in literature.  2. French literature—
History and criticism.  3. Travelers’ writings, 
French—History and criticism.  4. Travelers 
in literature.  5. ethnology in literature.  6. Im-
perialism in literature.  7. Travel—Philosophy. 
I. Title. 
pq145.6.t7c86   2010 
840.9'32—dc22   2010022013 
set in Galliard.
Buy the Book
For my parents
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
Contents
  
  acknowledgments ix
  Introduction 1
 1. The Muse of Paralysis 51
 2. Horizon of Conquest  
  Eugène Fromentin’s Algerian Narratives 95
 3. slow Progress  
  Jean Paulhan and Madagascar 155
 4. Frustration  
  Michel Leiris 199
 5. atopia  
  Roland Barthes 255
 6. The Wake of Ulysses 313
  Notes 357
  Bibliography 407
  Index 433
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
acknowledgments
a book is always the record of debts beyond reckoning, which makes 
penning one's acknowledgments a task both impossible and neces-
sary. This book reflects discussions and conversations with friends, 
students, and colleagues who contributed immeasurably to its com-
position over the years. Thanks are due first of all to my mentors, 
emily apter, Judith Butler, Neil Hertz, William ray, and ann 
smock, and to my colleagues in the Department of Comparative 
literature at UC-Irvine, especially eyal amiran, Jonathan Hall, and 
rei Terada. Much of the material here draws on courses I taught 
at UC-Irvine, and I am grateful to the students who indulged my 
interests and helped me puzzle through challenging texts. I have 
benefited from conversations with Homi Bhabha, James Clifford, 
Celeste langan, Françoise lionnet, Catherine Malabou, achille 
Mbembe, Gayatri spivak, and David Wills. emily apter, Denis 
Hollier, and richard sieburth were kind enough to read portions 
of the manuscript and offer their comments and suggestions. aron 
Vinegar invited me to present my work at a conference at Ohio state 
University at a crucial juncture in my research and writing. Claire 
Paulhan, at the Institut Mémoires de l'edition Contemporaine in 
Paris, was very gracious and generous with her time as I researched 
the Paulhan archives.
a resident fellowship at the Camargo Foundation in Cassis, France, 
allowed me to begin work on the book project. With a grant from 
the Harry ransom Center at the University of Texas at austin I was 
Buy the Book
x ack now ledgm en ts
able to consult the mud-spattered manuscript of leiris's L’Afrique 
fantôme. Travel grants from the UC-Irvine Humanities Center pro-
vided support for research in Paris, and a Borchard Foundation fel-
lowship at the Château de la Bretesche gave me much-needed time 
to complete the writing of the manuscript. a research associateship 
at the UC-Irvine Critical Theory Institute provided me with the 
facilities and resources to edit the completed text.
Gerald Prince and edward Dimendberg gave invaluable editorial 
assistance and helped find the manuscript a home. at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, ann Baker, ladette randolph, and Kristen 
rowley guided the book through the various stages with patience 
and care. sue Breckenridge copyedited the manuscript with meticu-
lous attention to detail. I would also like to thank the anonymous 
reviewers of the manuscript for their helpful comments and edito-
rial suggestions. I am thankful to the editors and publishers of the 
journals October, Formules, and Western Humanities Review for their 
permission to reprint previously published texts here.
It is a particular pleasure to thank the close friends who over 
the years lent me their support and gave intellectual and creative 
sustenance to this project: Chris andrews, ali Dadgar, Michelle de 
Kretser, Gareth Gollrad, Daniel Katz, eric Peterson, James Petter-
son, Kavita Philip, stefan Mattessich, Targol Mesbah, Ward smith, 
and Malina stefanovska. My family provided constant support even 
when my work must have seemed incomprehensible. Most of all I 
thank my partner, Dina al-Kassim, whose love, strength, patience, 
and unconditional support made this book possible.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from French sources are 
my own.
Buy the Book
Introduction
Chiasmus, from chiazein, to mark with a chi [X]: an 
inverted relationship between the syntactic elements 
of parallel phrases (as in . . . to stop too fearful, and too 
faint to go). — Merriam-Webster
The bind and the knot are necessary in order to take 
a step. — Derrida
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Paralyses
at the beginning of his collected essays in political anthropology, 
Pierre Clastres recounts a journey into the territory of the yanomami 
Indians. The author opens his text with a portrait of himself ex-
hausted, crawling in the mud, a “Molloy in the amazon,” as he puts 
it.1 On the trail of what he calls “the last free primitive society,” the 
grail of the ambitious ethnographer, Clastres is reduced to a clownish 
figure he identifies with a character from samuel Beckett.
This scene may serve as an emblem of my concerns in what fol-
lows. Clastres’s “Molloy in the amazon” shares with all the texts 
I examine here a critique of the figure of the modern traveler and 
doubts as to the viability of travel itself. The anthropologist’s wry 
self-portrait, I would argue, is more than a passing scruple or a 
literary flourish; it indicates, rather, a crisis in the representation of 
the traveler, whose authority is in question and whose story may 
confound narrative. Clastres’s critique of the traveler threatens to 
undermine the journey and its claims to knowledge and mastery, 
thereby setting the tone for his text. even as he bears witness to 
the threatened life-world of the yanomami, Clastres also testifies to 
his own inability to prevent the disappearance of their distinctive 
culture, or worse, as Western interloper, his unwitting implication 
in the changes he describes. anthropology as a result gives way to 
what lévi-strauss in Tristes Tropiques called entropology, “the name 
of the discipline concerned with the study of the highest manifesta-
tions of this process of disintegration.”2 Traveler and travelogue are 
thus marked with the signs of futility and exhaustion.
Clastres’s travelogue is characteristic of a strain of postcolonial 
anthropology for which travel, both as means of approach to its ob-
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jects and as organizing principle of narrative, is marred by a history 
of political control, commercial exploitation, and ideological abuse.3 
The development of mass tourism and the more recent encroach-
ments of “ecotourism” exacerbate these problems by putting the 
ethnographer at odds with travel circuits that are seen to contaminate 
local cultures. For Clastres and his contemporaries, travel cannot 
serve simply to authorize experience and justify knowledge, but 
confronts them with the political and technological limitations that 
underlie that experience and knowledge. Contemporary ethnographic 
travel no longer considers itself apart from the vectors of imperial 
power that made it possible as a field of study, and this contradiction 
between travel’s conditions of possibility and its avowed aims has 
yielded far-reaching insights in recent years into the epistemology 
and political genealogy of anthropology.4 The moral plaints of “en-
tropology” have thus led to a reflexive questioning of the discipline 
of anthropology itself as unwitting agent of colonial and imperial 
forms of controlling knowledge. Clastres made a vital contribution 
to these debates by arguing that europe confronted an “epistemo-
logical impossibility” in the New World, and that the legacy of that 
original failed encounter is still maintained in anthropology today by 
ingrained Western political notions of state, as well as our implication 
in its insatiable and “ethnocidal” outgrowths, empire and capital.5 
If empire haunts anthropology as a discipline, there are, however, 
more insidious forms of power whose contradictions, and indeed 
“impossibility,” may not lend themselves so readily to political and 
epistemological analysis. My aim in what follows is to examine such 
contradictions and their paralyzing logic. an intractable contradic-
tion of anthropology, one that implicates travel as its method of 
knowledge, pits the intention to study alien cultures against the 
intrusion required to conduct such study. This is, so to speak, the 
enabling contradiction of ethnography, one that is aggravated by 
the discipline’s traditional investment in “primitive” and purport-
edly pure cultures. as a result, Clastres’s lyrical and elegiac line “a 
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mortal shadow is being cast on all sides” is awkwardly complicit, as 
a consequence, with the prosaic disaster he foretells for the amazon: 
“oil derricks around the chabunos, diamond mines in the hillsides, 
police on the paths, boutiques on the riverbanks” (Archeology of 
Violence, 27). This attitude, including both its mournful rapture 
and its bitter complaint, resembles nothing so much as the refrain 
of the tourist, who fruitlessly negates the very means that render 
his mediated experience possible. In drawing such a comparison, 
my intent is not to conflate the righteous militancy of a Clastres 
combating ethnocide with the tourist’s mercenary demand for more 
local color. and yet the tourist haunts Clastres’s own travelogue, 
and his ironic deflation of his role as explorer is the symptom of a 
paralyzing contradiction he shares with the ordinary traveler.
lévi-strauss speaks of this contradiction of ethnographic travel in 
Tristes Tropiques. “I wished I had lived in the days of real journeys,” 
he reflects, while recognizing that his own travels are the source 
of more advanced anthropological knowledge, due to their very 
belatedness (43). The anthropologist is, as a result, “paralyzed by 
this dilemma,” and feels travel’s contradictions as the negation of all 
mobile options. “I have only two possibilities: either I can be like 
some traveller of the olden days, who was faced with a stupendous 
spectacle, all, or almost all, of which eluded him, . . . or I can be a 
modern traveller, chasing after the vestiges of a vanished reality.” as 
a good dialectician, however, lévi-strauss converts his contradic-
tion into a synthetic vision, and paralysis instead contributes to an 
immobilized structural order in which “evanescent forms” and the 
passage of time “crystallize into a sort of edifice” (44). The conver-
sion of the traveler’s paralysis into the stability of structure is enabled 
by a backward look at his journeys that distances his fieldwork in 
time. But rather than resolve the dilemma that first paralyzed him, 
lévi-strauss’s distancing strategy may only displace that dilemma. 
In Time and the Other, Johannes Fabian argues that such distancing 
strategies are inherent to the methodology of anthropology, whose 
Buy the Book
6“politics of time” denies a shared temporality with the cultures and 
peoples it studies. lévi-strauss’s case is exemplary for Fabian, since 
his “denial of coevalness” takes the radical form of a rejection of his-
tory and temporality as such in favor of structuralism’s synchronic 
taxonomies. This appeal to structure, Fabian shows, goes hand in 
hand with a negation of fieldwork, the spatiotemporal experience 
of travel and exchange that nonetheless grounds anthropological 
understanding. The mournful tone of Tristes Tropiques takes on the 
character of a more violent sacrifice in the light of Fabian’s critique: 
“living in the Time of the primitives, the ethnographer will be an 
ethnographer only if he outlives them, i.e., if he moves through the 
Time he may have shared with them onto a level on which he finds 
anthropology.”6 For lévi-strauss a synthesizing backward look re-
solves the traveler’s contradictions, and his paralyzing impasse is 
overcome. But, Fabian asserts, structuralist anthropologists “do not 
escape the aporia arising from the conflicting demands of coeval 
research and allochronic discourse” (60). For Fabian this inescap-
able impasse is constitutive of lévi-strauss’s work and, indeed, all 
anthropology.
This impasse is famously expressed in the first lines of Tristes 
Tropiques: “I hate travelling and explorers,” lévi-strauss says, only 
to add, “yet here I am proposing to tell the story of my expedi-
tions” (17). lévi-strauss’s defiant rejection of travel is more than an 
authorial anxiety of influence or literary avant-gardism; it breaks 
radically with travel and the travelogue, providing instead a vision 
of universal structuring codes of human society. Tristes Tropiques, 
a monument of modern travel writing, would aim at nothing less 
than a rejection of travel as such. This attitude, however, has a long 
genealogy. The critique of travel is endemic to French modernity and 
is linked to cultural transformations that in fundamental ways alter 
travel as form of experience and mode of representation. among 
these transformations are doubts as to the notion of progress and 
its attendant metaphors; a critique of colonialism, along with the 
i n t roduc t ion
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7figures of discovery, adventure, and conquest that sustain its ideol-
ogy; the rise of popular tourism, mass transit, and globalization; 
and technological changes that defy inherited representations of 
travel and transportation, prompting anxieties about spatiotemporal 
displacements within the lived present of the modern metropole 
itself. In 1859 Baudelaire vilified the very idea of progress in speaking 
of “a victory every minute lost, a progress forever denying itself,” 
a critique that would be echoed by the entire symbolist generation 
and beyond.7 These doubts are scathingly represented as well in 
Sentimental Education, where Flaubert describes a painting showing 
“the republic, or Progress, or Civilization, in the form of Christ 
driving a locomotive through a virgin forest.”8 Conrad, inheritor 
of Flaubert’s ironic vision, would later insist on the stillness of the 
journey related in Heart of Darkness as his steamship and its “pil-
grims” doggedly “crawled on.”9 Clastres’s invocation of Molloy is 
only a newer version of this ironic vision. In a more playful mode, 
Jean echenoz’s recent novel Courir delights in the absurd style of 
Zátopek, the fastest runner of his time: “emil seems to dig deep, or 
dig in, like a man in a trance or a workman shoveling the roadway. 
Far from all academic canons or any concern for elegance, emil’s 
progress is heavy, jerky, tortured, all fits and starts.”10 The “impos-
sible style” of the runner is like echenoz’s own, which seems to 
take up the baton from Beckett and his memorable descriptions of 
Molloy’s stumblings and Watt’s ridiculous gait.
such paralyses may be found in all modern literature, but are 
particularly insistent motifs in French writing. even the exceptions 
to this tendency confirm the rule; le Clézio, perhaps the happiest 
traveler in today’s more distinguished canon of writers, has been 
called “the most english of French writers.”11 a recent resurgence 
of travel literature in France, spearheaded by the manifesto Pour une 
littérature voyageuse, as well as the annual literary festival etonnants 
Voyageurs, defines itself explicitly as a challenge to French liter-
ary tradition in advocating for “le ‘travel writing’ à la française.”12 
i n t roduc t ion
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without a touch of nostalgia and indeed “neo-exoticism.”13 It may 
even be seen to reprise an effort in the early twentieth century to 
reinvigorate French colonialist writing through the example of the 
adventurous Conrad. The opening salvo in Tristes Tropiques against 
travel reflects this cultural context, and like other ambivalent state-
ments of its genre, fails to settle accounts with journeys to which 
it remains indebted. In what follows, then, I will sketch the salient 
features of a modern French resistance to travel in literature. In 
so doing, I will draw a distinction between the traveler’s habitual 
frustrations, disavowals, and negations on the one hand, and their 
more paralyzing contradictions on the other. The negation of travel 
is, in other words, symptomatic of a crisis of travel. But as symptom, 
it masks contradictions its author cannot resolve: aporias that are 
not negated or overcome, but that remain paralyzing dilemmas in 
the travelogue.
“every story is a travel story,” Michel de Certeau has pointed out.14 
We might say that lévi-strauss’s misgivings about telling his story 
struggle with the discursive fatality that narrative must plot itself out 
in space and time like a journey. More specifically, however, lévi-
strauss’s rejection of travel expresses a defining exclusion upon which 
his discipline is founded. as Fabian notes, “anthropology became an 
academic discipline when scientific discourse replaced narration—
when, to put it simply, the monograph replaced the travelogue.” 
Moreover, Fabian adds, this entailed “stationary fieldwork taking 
the place of travel.” This replacement, Fabian insists, is no innocent 
evolution but rather the result of a more suspicious “disavowal,”15 
and his work undertakes a reevaluation of the discipline in light of 
its traveling precursors, the missionaries, explorers, and amateur 
ethnographers who laid the groundwork for modern anthropol-
ogy. Fabian proposes a rehabilitation of these travelogues, while at 
the same time offering some of the most incisive demystifications 
of the ideology of travel by examining the complex and multiform 
i n t roduc t ion
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9practices of knowledge construction in the field. Fabian is thus able 
to avoid the symptomatic rejection of travel and offers instead a more 
nuanced view of its complexities in his study of explorers’ accounts, 
Out of Our Minds. Interestingly for our purposes, this entails a re-
consideration of travel and motion as they relate to immobility and 
stasis: “What is difficult to reconcile with the image of the intrepid 
traveler is that much, probably most, travel was stationary.” This 
distinction allows Fabian to challenge anthropology’s disavowal of 
travel and the travelogue. “Both travel and stay, motion and stillness 
. . . shaped these expeditions. This would be a truism, except for 
the realization that, while movement defined expeditions ideologi-
cally, in practice stops took up by far the larger portion of the total 
time spent.” By displacing and reversing the opposition of travel 
and stasis, Fabian applies a deconstructive strategy to his reading 
of the genealogy of ethnography; the myth of exploration, he says, 
“calls for deconstructive literary analysis.”16 But the deconstructive 
strategy of reversal and displacement, a key method in destabilizing 
the terms of a founding opposition, is only a means to a further 
critical aim: that of undoing the opposition itself and its binary 
logic. To do so would be to articulate another relation of mobility 
and stasis, of travel and stillness, one that I am pursuing here and 
call paralysis.
Paralysis is a recurrent symptom of the modern crisis of travel. 
Index of travel’s exhaustion as theme and mode of knowledge, paraly-
sis is travel’s ordeal, a trial suffered and undergone by the traveling 
subject, an experience less object of knowledge than symptom of 
the traveler’s unwitting passion. Paralysis is what remains of travel, 
what holds back and stays the traveler beset by contradictions. In 
this sense, and despite its negative connotations, paralysis remains 
close to travel’s etymology in the French word travail, for labor, 
toil, and torment. Travail itself derives from the latin trepalium, 
an instrument of torture, from which French also draws the word 
entraver: to shackle, impede, and restrain. The travails of travel 
i n t roduc t ion
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thus originate, as one etymologist ingenuously has it, in “the toil 
of travelling in olden times.”17 However, we might add, this toil is 
no less mythic than historical; in literature and mythology, travel’s 
ordeals are sanctioned by theological and metaphysical motifs relat-
ing to sacred terrors, rites of passage, and mortal trespass. Within 
this metaphysical horizon, only difficulty, or indeed impossibility, 
would seem to consecrate a journey worth relating. Paralysis, then, 
would be travel’s negative companion, but by a ruse common to 
our dialectical and metaphysical heritage, its negating power would 
serve a redemptive logic of useful toil, salutary travail, and mortal 
trespass. To read against the grain of this redemptive logic would 
be to consider paralysis otherwise than as negation or difficulty to 
overcome.
Derrida once ventured the term paralyse for the form of reading 
and interpretation called forth by such paths of thought.18 In texts 
on Freud’s death drive and Blanchot’s fictions, Derrida discerns a 
logic of death and negativity that articulates a different figure of 
death as border, and thus of the metaphysical figures of motion 
organized there, including transgression, mortal trespass, survival, 
and passing on. Paralyse, or paralysis, dwells at this border that 
yields nondialectical figures of mobility and stasis: pas, démarche, 
and dérive are among the duplicitous terms that Derrida employs 
to name these problematic border crossings. To think, as to travel, 
would be “the experience of the aporia,” neither stopping at the 
impasse nor passing beyond it, in the attempt to reckon with the 
paralyzing trace of the path.19 What Derrida says of Blanchot in 
“Pas” might well be extended to a broader scope of texts: “If a sci-
ence or a theory of reading these narratives were to constitute itself, 
coming round in the end, or resorting to its name, I would call it 
paralysis [la paralyse].”20 Paralyse suggests itself here as a near-synonym 
for Derrida’s own methodology, though Derrida qualifies his own 
statement with conditional verbs, and his “en venir à son nom” is 
rife with ambiguities. If Derrida subsequently took his distance 
i n t roduc t ion
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from the term, this retraction is already anticipated here, and is not 
unlike his hesitation in committing to a master term for what came 
to be called deconstruction. Paralyse, in other words, goes “under 
erasure.”21 Other terms thus challenge the singularity of paralyse: 
contre-allée, for instance, combines, in aporetic form, the ideas of 
both traveling “with” and “against.”22 adopting the orphan term 
paralyse for my own purposes here, Paralyses will demonstrate its 
broad resonance with the discourse and cultural politics of modern 
French travel.23
“Molloy in the amazon.” If I am stuck on this image it is due 
to the crisis of travel it captures, and because, linking ethnography 
and literature in one stroke, it emblematizes the textual analysis and 
politics of translation that have become hallmarks of contemporary 
critical anthropology. This image also stays with me because the 
name of Beckett is tied to the most difficult and challenging figu-
rations of paralytic motion. Clastres may well have been thinking 
of Foucault when he penned his lines, since “The Discourse on 
language,” which was published shortly before Clastres’s own text, 
also begins with a Beckettian reference: “I must go on; I can’t go 
on; I must go on; I must say words as long as there are words, I 
must say them until they find me, until they say me—heavy burden, 
heavy sin; I must go on . . .”24 at grips with discourse, obligation, 
and sin, Beckett’s contradictions and perplexities serve to develop 
Foucault’s argument on the will to truth, conceived as an ordering 
of discourse by means of strategic systems of exclusion. Foucault 
allows us to reconsider lévi-strauss’s denial of travel as symptom 
of the will to truth and its denial of power and desire. “I hate travel-
ling and explorers. yet here I am proposing to tell the story of my 
expeditions.” This contradiction, Fabian would argue, structures 
anthropological knowledge as a constitutive aporia. In lévi-strauss’s 
autobiographical salvo we hear, in other words, the anonymous 
voice of anthropology echoing that of Beckett’s character: “I must 
go on; I can’t go on . . .”
i n t roduc t ion
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It is ironic that Beckett’s famous epigram should have become a 
password of sorts, translated by many commentators into all-too-
meaningful statements about futility and the absurd. On the other 
hand, the emphasis is warranted, since Beckett remained doggedly 
attached to such statements, from his earliest works to Worstward 
Ho. The latter text’s minimalist reiteration of The Unnamable strik-
ingly renders its epigram as the alternating play, at once chiastic and 
aporetic, of the two mere words “no” and “on.”25 Only in recent 
years have critics taken Beckett’s paralytic statements as more than 
negations or contradictions. leslie Hill, for instance, observes that 
“all Beckett’s protagonists set out on a journey which ends in an 
impasse,” and adds that to read the journey’s impasse thematically 
and teleologically would be to confer on Beckett’s travels a progres-
sion and destination they deny at every step. as Hill points out, 
“Beckett’s rewriting of the quest narrative is not an attempt just to 
toy with the forms of the past,” but reflects instead “an aporetic crisis 
in the whole articulation of subjective space.” What Hill calls “a 
system of self-cancelling alternatives” is characteristic of this aporetic 
crisis. “The space of journeying, like writing, becomes a space of 
indifference, . . . of movements made and then undone, advanced 
but annulled, of opposites set up and then abolished, of unity as-
sumed and then divided.”26 Interestingly, as Hill’s own commentary 
shows, it is seemingly impossible to convey these aporias without 
asserting a sequence of textual moves (“and then, and then”), so that 
the critic himself falls in with Beckett’s double injunction “I can’t” 
and “I must.” This is what leo Bersani calls “impeded reading,” an 
effect of the Beckettian text’s self-obstruction.27 Bersani sees these 
impediments as enabling, through the near-ruin of representation, 
access to domains of affective experience repressed by narrative’s 
ordering principles and spatiotemporal coordinates. Beckett’s pa-
ralyses thus do not simply negate travel or motion but allow for 
other transports at the limits of representation.
i n t roduc t ion
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Travel and narrative are intimately linked. To tamper with the 
narrative codes of travel, as Beckett does, is to challenge the basic 
storylines with which we order our lives. accordingly, the aim of 
the following chapters is to show how paralyses undo the certain-
ties of knowledge, presenting alternatives to the normative cod-
ings of travel, transports, and narrative. These alternatives, raised 
in moments of paralysis, may be political, sexual, or affective. at 
the limit—and paralysis always concerns a problematic limit—what 
presents itself may be more than a mere option and a decision; the 
alternative instead poses the challenge of the radically other. For 
this reason my focus has been on anthropological discourse, which 
traditionally concerns other worlds, other peoples, and other times. 
anthropology thus has an implicitly ethical bent, oriented as it is 
toward the strange, the foreign, and the other. at the same time, 
however, one may argue that the ethical relationship is incomplete 
unless it calls language into question, unmastering the account one 
makes of the journey and the encounter. For this reason, as Fabian 
notes, language is a vital companion to the anthropological jour-
ney, not as a mere stylistic turn but as an exploration of the limits 
of language, narrative, and knowledge. attuned to the “poetics” of 
its practice, anthropology today increasingly figures itself as a mode 
of cultural translation.28 Translation, of course, implies transport: 
trans (across) and latus (borne) suggests a spatial transfer of mean-
ing across languages. The figure and the practice always have an 
essentializing tendency, however, as what seems to be carried over is 
the “spirit” of the letter, not the material particularity of the source 
text. Translators have long been aware of this conundrum, of course, 
but only contemporary theory has been able to articulate the prop-
erly paralyzing implications of translation as a task both impossible 
and necessary. In recent years, and in response to the challenge of 
poststructuralist ethics, translation studies have complicated the 
classical model of translation as travel, suggesting that a certain 
i n t roduc t ion
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untranslatability is the measure of fidelity and responsibility. “The 
translator’s task is inevitably an ethical one,” sandra Bermann says, 
while recognizing that “language imposes internal barriers to ap-
propriative understanding as well as to transparent communication.” 
Translation, accordingly, is modeled less on metaphors of transport 
and delivery than on figures of interweaving and imbrication, in 
which the unmasterable otherness of the translator’s language links 
with the unassimilable idiom of the other. “linguistic ligatures,” 
in Bermann’s words,29 being “tied up or trussed,” and “entwined” 
in a “tangle,” in spivak’s, speak to new models of translation as 
the paralyzing weave of a double bind.30 Confronting such binds, 
the journey comes to a halt, breaking down, as Judith Butler has it, 
paralyzing travel and narrative alike in an encounter that remains, 
even in its ethical responsibility, unnarratable and paradoxically 
unaccountable.31
roland Barthes poses this challenge to travel and narrative in s/z, 
where he asks us to imagine the story of a journey without arrival 
or departure. staying without arriving; traveling without depart-
ing; neither arriving or not: Barthes’s paradoxical journey defies 
the normative codes of narrative and suggests the “self-cancelling 
alternatives” Hill ascribes to Beckett. “a scandal of readerliness,” 
as Barthes puts it,32 such a journey would thus no doubt provoke 
Bersani’s “impeded reading” as well. Barthes’s narrative mutations 
are more than a mere aesthetic concern. at stake in such questioning 
of travel and narrative is the invention of mobilities that defy travel’s 
presumed spatiotemporal coordinates and their normative coding 
in narratives of desire, conquest, and exploration. such paradoxical 
transports, moreover, provide the means to understand new muta-
tions of travel that contemporary commentators may be ill equipped 
to conceptualize. Indeed, new technologies raise the stakes in this 
effort to reconceive modern travel. Take, for instance, the formula-
tions of Paul Virilio, whose diagnoses of modern technology’s para-
doxical transports seemingly echo the words of Barthes: “Currently 
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. . . we are seeing the beginnings of a ‘generalized arrival’ whereby 
everything arrives without having to leave, the nineteenth-century’s 
elimination of the journey . . . combining with the abolition of de-
parture at the end of the twentieth, the journey thereby losing its 
successive components and being overtaken by arrival alone.” Unlike 
Barthes, Virilio’s willful paradoxes of transport (“static vehicle,” 
“virtual velocity,” etc.) ultimately appeal to outmoded theological 
and metaphysical grounding: the “soul” and the “here and now.” 
Virilio’s paralyses thus fall in with the mournful tone of Clastres 
and lévi-strauss in his nostalgia for what he calls “the essence of 
the path, the journey,” and “the voyage of the navigator or the trek 
of the lone explorer.”33
Modernity has long been equated with movement, change, and 
instability, whether in Marx’s sobering diagnosis of the economic 
disequilibrium fostered by capital or the Futurists’ rapturous embrace 
of speed.34 and while this modern predicament has always provoked 
resistance and prompted reflection on the value of tradition and 
stability, such responses often tend to fall back on nostalgic tropes, 
even when, as in Virilio, they compulsively invoke figures of paradox. 
Virilio’s paradoxes should, however, be answered not in the mode 
of nostalgia, but instead in a more critical—and playful—spirit. 
ross Chambers’s Loiterature contributes to such an effort, draw-
ing on Beckett to advance what he calls a “poetics of digression.” 
Digressiveness is not only wayward and wandering, Chambers says, 
but is marked by a tendency toward narrative slowness and stasis. 
“loiterature,” as Chambers names it, is a potential feature of any 
text, but is most characteristic of literary modernity, whose slow-
ness and digressions constitute disorderly challenges to the order of 
proper narrative, and as such, express errant pleasures that contest 
the rules of discursive conduct and social rectitude. The subversive 
force and elusive charm of such texts lie in skirting the norm and 
testing limits, rather than in confronting the law. as Chambers 
says, “there is a type of practice, the digressive, that perhaps offers 
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a model of how the law can be more effectively subverted, since in 
it something that does not manifest itself as subversive nevertheless 
has the power to put the law into question.”35 Digression, then, is 
an alternative to the frontal assault of transgression, and if it gives 
up the path of confrontation, it gains, however, in its room for play 
and seduction.
The subversiveness of Chambers’s loiterature and the poetics of 
digression owe something to the poststructuralist turn in the analysis 
of power and dissidence, and in particular to Foucault, for whom 
power is not simply wielded, confronted, or endured, but distrib-
uted in more complex ways among disciplinary subjects. Foucault’s 
“a Preface to Transgression” sets out the program for this study of 
power in an homage to Bataille. Chambers himself refers to Bataille 
in drawing a distinction between transgression and digression, stat-
ing that, unlike digression, “transgression and the law are intimately 
bound up with each other such that the law requires transgression 
as that which confirms its status as law” (Loiterature, 89). Cham-
bers’s account of Bataille posits a mutually defining relationship 
between law and transgression that, however, returns Bataille to 
the very dialectical system he aimed to undo. For Bataille, after all, 
transgression is not dialectical but aporetic; like Blanchot, Bataille 
insists on the impossibility of transgression that brings the dialectic 
to a standstill.36 Consequently, Chambers’s wandering digression, 
such as he defines it, is insufficiently distinguished from the trans-
gression he would oppose. Moreover, digression merges with the 
dialectical transgression he attributes to Bataille, for if digression 
exploits “loopholes” in the law, Chambers says, “the loophole that 
it represents in the law is itself subject to a law: the law of loopholes. 
and the law of loopholes is that they are, in turn, constrained by the 
very order that they disturb” (Loiterature, 93–94). Paralysis, as feature 
of Beckettian digression, is thus cast as a dialectical confrontation 
of opposites, and, indeed, a “metaphysical paralysis,” as Chambers 
says (100). Chambers thus speaks of a “paralysis—etymologically, a 
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“coming loose” or “coming unstrung”—that simultaneously alludes 
to a desired inertia and signifies the impossibility of its attainment, 
for this paralysis is a state of suspension that derives from digres-
sion’s oxymoronic pull toward a state of stasis, on the one hand, 
and a need to move or even a desire to progress, that is, to move 
on, on the other” (93). If, as Chambers correctly notes, Beckett’s 
fiction is both paralyzed and “aporetic” (101), Chambers’s account 
of its digressive stasis remains wedded to formulations of oppo-
sition and contradiction. Chambers’s analysis of Beckett is thus 
another case of “impeded reading,” provoked by the challenge of 
such paradoxical expressions as Beckett’s “gress,” “gression,” and 
“moving pause.” In reference to the latter, Chambers says, “such 
a busy pause is the opposite of stasis: it is a suspension” (101). This 
supposed opposition, unconvincing in itself, seems a symptom of 
a reading that insists on a play of contraries, even where Beckett 
defies them. Chambers’s account of Beckett’s narrative thus inad-
vertently mirrors the critic’s own difficult critical choices in the face 
of textual undecidability. “Constantly making choices—whether 
to go in or to come out, whether to move or to stay put, whether 
to move in this direction or that—but making choices in a world 
in which there is no reason to prefer any particular option over its 
alternative, results in aporia.”
such impeded reading is the almost inevitable consequence of 
reading Beckett’s strange transports. But were we to pursue Cham-
bers’s “law of loopholes” with Derrida, a way out of the stalemate 
of sheer contradiction might be found. Paralysis as a “coming un-
strung” would likewise yield a different sense than that of loosening 
or unlacing; Derrida proposes instead a model of “stricture” and 
“destricturation” that is paralyzing, precisely, due to its undecid-
ability, as seen in his essay on Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s 
boots. Derrida’s essay is digressive in an exemplary way: stubbornly 
off-topic, it dwells at length on what seems trivial and virtually 
irrelevant, ignored by Heidegger, and insists on a slowness that is 
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nearly immobile: “We’re getting nowhere. We’re not even sliding 
around, we’re floundering [Nous piétinons. Nous ne patinons même 
pas, nous pataugons]).”37 The critic willingly trudges and flounders, 
the latter verb less evocative of Heidegger’s privileged terms “way” 
and “soil,” no doubt, than Beckett’s mud. In the course of this 
slow, but never slow enough reading, what emerges, in a manner 
characteristic of Derrida, is the seemingly marginal detail in the 
painting that displaces and eclipses the whole: in this case, the 
shoelaces. The lace (lacet) is also a snare (lacet), one that sets a trap: 
“another type of trap and of what in ‘Pas’ was named paralysis [la 
paralyse].”38 The lacing of the boots, their passing in and out of 
eyelets in crisscross fashion, provides Derrida a model for thinking 
of a linking and differentiating that is beyond the logic of duality, 
opposition, and dialectic. The “pair” of boots is thus only the first 
pairing that calls for deconstruction, and which includes margin/
center, inside/outside, representation/represented, part/whole. The 
interlacing is a nonoppositional and differential relation that, like 
the framing parergon, links inside to outside, only to confound the 
two, according to “the figure or trajectory of the lace: a stricture by 
alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, from under 
to over” (Truth in Painting, 321). The shoelaces thus provide another 
model, crucial to Derrida, of a chiastic interlacing of asymmetrical 
terms.39 such is the paralyzing logic of the margin: delimiting the 
border of a given work, it simultaneously unworks that border and 
the distinctions it would support. “The picture is caught in the lace 
which it yet seems to include as its part” (Truth in Painting, 331). 
Nothing is more natural than to trip on these shoelaces which, 
both tight and loose, differentiate every pairing without opposing, 
contrasting, or negating: “the trap always works in the interlace, 
whether it misleads, lets go, or paralyzes.” 40
It is with such a paralyzing trap that Derrida opens his famous 
critique of lévi-strauss’s amazon journeys in Of Grammatology. 
Tristes Tropiques delivers a compelling version of anthropology’s fatal 
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contact narrative, cast by lévi-strauss as the violent intrusion of 
writing into the world of the Nambikwara. as Derrida argues, this 
representation of writing as contaminating agent is allied to one of 
metaphysics’ most pervasive claims, the opposition between writing 
and speech, an opposition that articulates some of the fundamental 
distinctions of metaphysical thought. In lévi-strauss’s account, the 
fatal contact with writing supports a portrait of the Nambikwara 
as innocent, autonomous, and natural. But writing, as constitutive 
exclusion of Western thought, troubles the vital distinctions it would 
claim to uphold, and vitiates, indeed, the very object of traditional 
anthropology: the “primitive,” or “peoples without writing.” For 
Derrida, these distinctions are troubled at the outset by the path 
that leads to the Nambikwara, opening their world to the outside; 
indeed, writing is inscribed in this very path. Quoting from lévi-
strauss, Derrida stops him, so to speak, in his track: “a picada (a 
crude trail whose ‘track’ is ‘not easily distinguished from the bush’).” 
Derrida suggests that “one should meditate upon all of the following 
together: writing as the possibility of the road and of difference, the 
history of writing and the history of the road, of the rupture, of the 
via rupta, of the path that is broken, beaten, fracta, of the space of 
reversibility and of repetition traced by the opening, the divergence 
from, and the violent spacing, of nature.” as a consequence, Der-
rida says, “it is difficult to imagine that access to the possibility of a 
road-map is not at the same time access to writing.” 41 The logic of 
the trace, here, follows the meanings of “path” and “footprint” that 
have become obsolete, or nearly so, in english.42 By anticipating 
writing in this way, the native path brings the anthropologist up 
short in his quest. Moreover, if the “territory of the Nambikwara 
is crossed by the line of an autochthonic picada,” as Derrida says, 
the word “crossed” (traversé) suggests not only crossing through but 
crossing out: a line, that is, lying as much across the path as it does 
along it. The native path, in other words, confronts the traveler with 
an aporia: both line of demarcation and passageway, a line that both 
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marks vital distinctions and passes through them. Neither writing 
nor speech, the native path is the trace of what Derrida calls “arche-
writing” or “arche-violence,” inscribing the inevitable loss of the 
proper that lévi-strauss’s moral fables and Clastres’s “archeology 
of violence” narrate in the mode of mourning. The native path 
as aporia, deconstructing the anthropologist’s moral plaints, thus 
provides another means to understand what renato rosaldo has 
called “imperialist nostalgia.” rather than being mere hypocrisy 
or bad faith of the anthropologist, rosaldo’s “mourning for what 
one has destroyed” 43 should be traced back to the path as entame 
that both “breaches” and “broaches,” as spivak’s translation has 
it, in one stroke. Instead of merely immobilizing the traveler, “the 
experience of the aporia,” Derrida says in one of his texts on mourn-
ing, “gives or promises the thinking of the path.” 44 accordingly, Of 
Grammatology reclaims rousseau from lévi-strauss, for whom the 
philosopher represents the founder of ethnology.45 Derrida instead 
argues that the crucial contribution of rousseau lies not in his theo-
ries of natural man or his mournful critique of cultural decline, but 
rather in the duplicitous figures, such as the supplement, that waylay 
his philosophy, narratives, and travels.46
attention to such a paralyzing logic exposes a thread common to 
modern narratives of travel: a tendency toward stasis that belies the 
journey and its ostensible purpose. In touristic narratives, moments of 
stasis tend to express, in symptomatic form, the traveler’s conventional 
frustrations: a bid for originality and authenticity always threatened 
by rivalry and mediation; an experience of otherness frustrated by 
mere spectacle and convention; and a desire to capture history from 
within a touristic consciousness blind to its own historical nature. 
In this way, frustrated travel is at grips with difficulties all too easily 
overcome—if only by compensatory illusions—or alternately, too 
readily taken as sheer obstacle. Paralysis, however, expresses more 
than contradiction; as we have seen, its aporias expose the stymied 
traveler to what is both necessary and impossible in transport and 
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translation. These aporias lie in the very track of the traveler as they 
do the unaccountable trace of his narrative. If, as ross Chambers has 
argued, literature is by nature dilatory and slow, paralyses could be 
considered, in their insouciance to difficulty, an expression of the 
loiterly and playful resources of literary writing. The tragic aspect 
of paralyses would be the counterpart to this tendency: not a loi-
terly playing with transgression, but a painful confrontation with 
absolute limitations. aporia, however, expresses neither of these 
options. Only a reading that is slow enough, indeed paralyzed, 
can account for the transports of the paralyzed traveler. Paralysis, 
then, is not only the object of these studies but the name of their 
critical approach.
Hesitations
My argument so far has drawn on Western travels to show how the 
encounter with the other provokes a breakdown in the journey and 
its narrative. I have argued that such breakdowns stage an ethical 
encounter that, however, often remains incomplete and symptom-
atic. The task of a paralyzed reading is to dwell at such problematic 
moments in the text to bring out the text’s implicit challenge to 
its own motives, drives, and transports. Postcolonial authors, for 
their part, have rewritten narratives of travel to contest and subvert 
accounts of Western discovery and conquest. such postcolonial 
journeys are a critical counterpoint to Western travel, exploiting 
the contradictions and lapses of the colonial vision. and while con-
testation and subversion are valuable resources in this challenge 
to the norms of travel, some of the most far-reaching postcolonial 
critiques lie not only in political opposition but also in an explora-
tion of shared complicities and knotted histories. For such writers, 
as in our examples so far, discovery and conquest may become the 
site of a paralyzing encounter as well.
James Clifford has shown how the contemporary Native ameri-
can is constrained by a double bind whose logic demands that the 
aboriginal be utterly different—at the risk of isolation and death—yet 
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make himself known in the language and culture of the colonizer—
at the risk of losing his identity. To escape this double bind Clifford 
suggests that “along with the history of resistances we need a history 
of hesitations.” 47 such hesitations may not be the stuff of adven-
ture and drama, but are the persistent and necessary strategies of 
survival that defy the either-or logic of resistance and submission, 
assimilation and isolation. even a story of postcolonial revolution, 
such as C. l. r. James’s The Black Jacobins, confirms Clifford’s “his-
tory of hesitations”; James aptly speaks of Toussaint l’Ouverture as 
embodying “vacillation” at a key point in his struggle for Haitian 
independence from France.48 What Clifford calls hesitation I have, 
for my part, been calling paralysis. Paralysis lies at the crux of the 
matter, a place of crossed identities and crossed destinies, where 
decisions are made in the absence of clear alternatives, where vi-
tal distinctions are needed yet lacking. This crux, moreover, has 
the crisscross form of a double bind. I would argue, then, that its 
paralyzing logic is not so easily dispatched, and indeed provides 
the means to articulate a way beyond the alternatives of aboriginal 
resistance and opposition.
such a paralyzing crux is found in Jamaica Kincaid’s “In History,” 
an essay that revisits the journeys of discovery to the New World. 
Claiming that all modern history bears the trace of slavery and the 
slave trade, Kincaid says she would like to mark that trace with an 
asterisk. The asterisk would indicate where a footnote to the “of-
ficial story” of Western travel is needed.49 What Kincaid modestly 
calls her own “addition” to this official history does not, however, 
do justice to the transformations and displacements this footnote 
would entail, which her searching, wide-ranging, and allusive text 
amply proves. such a footnote cannot simply be added, since it would 
threaten to undermine and overflow the official story. The asterisk 
thus indicates an impossible yet necessary addition. Moreover, the 
spot marked by this asterisk is not that of a place or a boundary; it 
is, like the crux, that of a limit both crossed over and crossed out. 
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The crux, then, does not simply mark the spot; its crosswise suture 
marks instead an overlapping of sites, histories, and identities. To 
encounter the crux is to be paralyzed.
In her imaginary journey home to her native island of antigua, 
Kincaid tries to imagine her people and her land as seen through 
the eyes of Columbus. at the same time, traveling with Columbus, 
she tries to counter that discovery with her own claiming of an-
tigua, to “speak of it as if no one has ever heard of it before” (“In 
History,” 3). The journey thus mimes that of Columbus, yet aims 
instead at an undiscovered aboriginal antigua. Is this other, older 
antigua “in” history, or outside of it? Can Kincaid’s asterisk displace 
what is already, as she says, a “footnote” to history in Columbus’s 
own account, his passing mention of her island? and her footnote 
to this footnote, can it find a proper place in the text of history? 
Kincaid’s journey home is a belated return, of course, and so finds 
itself on the side of colonial history, its language, and its texts. Her 
discovery can only be a rediscovery of antigua, and a return not to 
her home but only to the moment of fatal contact, perhaps to the 
very line of demarcation between a historical before and after. But it 
would be too simple to assert that Kincaid’s belatedness condemns 
her to this side of history, much as she insists that it is “the human 
imagination that I am familiar with, the only one that dominates 
the world in which I live.” Kincaid’s asterisk indicates, instead, a 
point of discrepant history, where the myths of travel and progress 
are shadowed by another temporality. Indeed, the asterisk does 
not allow for a clear demarcation of a historical before and after, of 
the time of a people without history and that of Western history. 
Kincaid’s belatedness is, rather, that of a continuous present, the 
postcolonial moment of an “open wound” that sutures and divides 
past and future, “each breath I take in and expel healing and opening 
the wound again and again, over and over” (1). Kincaid’s journey is 
thus neither simply opposed to that of Columbus, nor fated to fol-
low in its wake. rather, it finds its subversive potential in traveling 
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“tout contre” (right next to/completely against), as Derrida says, in 
the strange complicity of a paralyzing “counterpath.”
Due to her predicament of belatedness, Kincaid’s pared down, 
disarmingly simple language is marked with duplicity and repetition 
even at the crucial moment in her imaginary journey when she ar-
rives home. “What were the things growing on the land?” Kincaid 
asks. “I pause for this. What were the things growing on that land 
and why do I pause for this?” (“In History,” 3). The “why” of Kin-
caid’s pausing is as important here as the “what” she indicates. This 
pause, hesitation, or paralysis is more than an occasion to stop and 
take stock of a momentous occasion. It indicates, rather, what defies 
indication, and even the index of an asterisk. The minimal altera-
tion of “the land” to “that land” is pregnant with this impossible 
referent: the home as seen by the other, where her people suddenly 
“make an appearance” in history, but also, simultaneously, the one 
unknown to history, to which Kincaid also claims to belong. This 
is surely a decisive moment, for the appearance of her people fore-
tells the impending consequences of genocide, slavery, and, more 
recently, the neocolonial economy of tourism. a decisive moment 
Kincaid would surely choose to change. Why, then, her indecision 
and hesitation? What gives pause here is not simply that the past 
cannot be altered, that the fatal contact has already occurred, but 
that Kincaid’s voice cannot extricate itself from the crux that binds 
her aboriginal land to its simultaneous appearance and disappearance 
in the text of history. This is, moreover, the same double bind that 
requires that she voice her story from within the story of her own 
eradication. Kincaid thus speaks from the place of the subaltern, 
where the voice of counterhistory expresses what is constitutively 
erased or foreclosed from history, and confronts that erasure as the 
enabling condition of her speech. In this postcolonial paradox, she 
attempts to reclaim, in the language of colonization, an identity 
destroyed by that language. In a sense, her reclaiming of her his-
tory and her home owes itself to the erasure of that history, and 
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her journey with Columbus simply revisits the erasure of her home. 
This does not amount, of course, to a submission to that language 
and its history, but neither is it the dialectical overturning of that 
history. It is, instead, a voice that articulates itself with the trace 
of the other, a trace that cannot be authored or appropriated. This 
postcolonial predicament makes Kincaid herself, like her homeland, 
an ambiguous referent, “I, me,” both subject and object, fixed in 
the gaze of the uncomprehending other, yet stubbornly claiming 
recognition: “the person you see before you” (“In History,” 4); “the 
person standing in front of you” (3).
Kincaid’s insistence on her present visual appearance, marked by 
her black and aboriginal heritage, is a claim to history in the name 
of “all who look like me” (“In History,” 1). To make this claim 
the text thus narrows in on the very moment of discovery when, 
Kincaid says, “I and the people who look like me begin to make an 
appearance” (4). a repetitive and obsessive motif in Kincaid’s text, 
this “making an appearance” is the ironic moment of a discovery 
that grants yet denies identity, that recognizes only through mis-
recognition: the postcolonial legacy of Columbus, “who started 
the narrative from which I trace my beginning.” Kincaid does not, 
however, bow to the necessity of this beginning, since she insists as 
well on speaking from the standpoint of one who is “not yet in the 
picture” and, indeed, claims that “I have not yet made an appear-
ance” (1). This is more than an attempt to turn back the clock of 
history or to defy the narrative of “discovery.” It is, rather, to dwell 
at the crux of discovery, to “trace my beginning” to the moment 
of encounter, a moment that is also, moreover, that of her present 
appearance “standing in front of you.” Kincaid’s rebellious text thus 
makes a scene, talking back to history, but does not simply claim or 
reclaim a lost or neglected identity. Instead, she marks the trace of 
her beginning, a trace that neither appears or not: the trace, in other 
words, of a “pre-emergent” self, to use Gayatri spivak’s formulation, 
which testifies to an identity foreclosed by history.50 This trace lies 
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in the margins of Columbus’s journey, and as “a reader of this ac-
count of the journey” (“In History,” 2) Kincaid occupies the place 
of Columbus’s foreclosed other, the antiguan native. Kincaid’s evo-
cation of the antiguan aboriginal would, then, be neither fiction 
nor history, but rather, in spivak’s terms, “the (im)possibility of a 
vicarious (un)reading, the perspective of the “native informant” 
(Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 35).
Kincaid’s “In History” indeed provides a striking illustration of 
spivak’s theory of the “native informant.” The native informant, as 
spivak defines it, is neither the data-providing interlocutor of the 
ethnographer nor the postcolonial agent of an autonomous speech 
act. rather, the native informant lies in the margins of the dominant 
discourse of Western history as a figure paradoxically necessary to 
the truth-claims of that discourse, yet occluded from the scene. 
This “foreclosure” is thus more than a denial or a disavowal of the 
other; it is, instead, the mark of a structuring absence upon which 
the dominant text depends. like Kincaid reading Columbus, spivak 
reads Kant for evidence of the aboriginal “raw man,” and shows 
that “rhetorically crucial at the most important moment in the 
argument, it is not part of the argument in any way” (Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason, 13). strictly speaking, there is no “arguing” with 
this discrepancy in Kant; spivak thus warns against the “opposi-
tion between master and native” (37) that can unwittingly produce 
a mere “legitimation-by-reversal” (39). The postcolonial critic’s task 
is, instead, to move “from opposition to critique” and explore the 
“complicities” that bind the master discourse to its others (147). I 
have argued that Kincaid’s crux is the index of such a complicity 
with history’s official story. similarly, spivak’s “complicity” is the 
place at which Kant’s text relies on an aboriginal other—the austra-
lian aboriginal and the south american Fuegan—that it nonethe-
less forecloses. These paralyzing contradictions in Kant’s text are 
overcome all too easily in the “axiomatics of imperialism” (34) that 
consigns the other to a mere supplement. an important moment 
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in spivak’s critique comes when she tries to take stock of the his-
tory and culture of the aboriginals Kant summarily dismisses. This 
entails a long footnote on colonialism and anthropology that runs 
to four pages: “the manuscript got stalled for years,” spivak says, 
admitting that “I cannot write that other book that bubbles up in 
the cauldron of Kant’s contempt” (28). like Kincaid’s asterisk, this 
footnote indexes an infinite labor in the margins of official history: 
“a parenthesis, in a note, on the note on a note” (48).51 This infinite 
supplementarity, both paralyzing and motivating, follows the trace 
of the other in the master discourse.
Kincaid’s voice is thus a testimony to what spivak calls the found-
ing foreclosure of the aboriginal in colonial thought and Western 
reason. a challenge to Columbus’s appropriating mission, the crux 
of Kincaid’s text indexes what cannot be claimed or reclaimed, an 
aboriginal world more ancient than antigua itself: the trace of the 
other that resists historical appropriation and persists as the infinite 
supplement to history and the postcolonial present. Kincaid’s opposi-
tion is asymmetrical to colonial history in that it does not presume 
to reappropriate the aboriginal or claim redress or reparations. and 
yet, of course, the wounds of history can inform political action in 
favor of the aboriginal. This aboriginal is, however, not only the 
victim of violence, but also the testimony to an “arche-violence” 
more ancient even than antigua.52 To speak as an ab-original is to 
speak as one deriving from an origin that can be neither appropri-
ated nor denied. To speak for the oppressed is thus to take sides 
where sides are lacking, where the crisscross suture “heal[s] and 
open[s] the wound again and again.” Talking back to empire and 
writing her way back home, Kincaid testifies to the impossibility 
of any simple return address. Indeed, her text seems finally to circle 
only around a handful of paralyzing questions: “and now how to 
go on,” she asks in a Beckettian vein (“In History,” 6); “What to 
call the thing that happened to me?”; “should I call it history?” (1); 
“what is history?” (2). These paralyzing questions touch on what is 
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perhaps the very origin of Kincaid’s text. “It is almost as if what is 
told,” spivak says, “is the result of an obstinate misunderstanding 
of the rhetorical question that transforms the condition of the (im)
possibility of answering—of telling the story—into the condition of 
its possibility. every production of experience, thought, knowledge, 
all humanistic production, perhaps especially the representation 
of the subaltern in history or literature, has this double bind at its 
origin.”53 Out of this origin, always a supplement, Kincaid voices 
the necessary yet impossible claiming of her aboriginal home. Her 
faltering prose undermines both the journey and its telling to narrate 
not a return but a departure from the certainties of home, origin, 
and belonging.
and yet, departure too loses its conventional bearings as a result 
of this absent origin. The figures of transport provoked by this 
predicament are necessarily vexed, but still enable mobile tactics 
of identification and desire. For Glissant, such mobile tactics arise 
precisely from the lack of any possibility of a return, and in the 
promise of a Caribbean identity free of the illusion of an original 
self. In Glissant’s terms, “reversion” to an origin is thus expressed in 
duplicitous “diversions,” themselves oriented toward an “entangle-
ment” akin to Kincaid’s paralyzing crux. “Diversion,” Glissant says, 
“is nourished by reversion: not a return to the longing for origins, 
to some immutable state of Being, but a return to the point of en-
tanglement, from which we were forcefully turned away.” Due to 
this insight, even the most violent cuts do not call for reunification, 
but rather for a closer attention to a visceral entanglement. “The 
machete, more twisted than knotted entrails.”54 Voicing a historical 
trauma, Kincaid invites us “to listen to departure,” as Cathy Caruth 
puts it, calling on us to bear the responsibility for a traumatic event 
and a singular place that are always belated, always displaced, but 
which endure in the stubborn index of a historical asterisk.55
“Only the impossible can make me still,” Kincaid says in A Small 
Place. litotic and devastating by turns, Kincaid’s searing monologue 
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buttonholes the tourist and confronts his insouciant pleasures with 
the postcolonial realities of antiguan life.56 To be “still” is not so 
much a desire for calm and repose as it is the demand coming from 
an ignorant and tormenting other—the touristic “you” of Kincaid’s 
insubordinate address—that she stop her ranting and retribution.57 
Here the polemical “you” is the site of another entanglement that 
Kincaid, for all her righteous hostility, cannot solve, since her own 
language embodies the hateful colonizing other from whom she 
wants to extricate herself. and yet within that entanglement surely 
the promise of another stillness is voiced, that of a hoped-for peace 
and resolution that could finally heal her wounds. In this sense, 
then, Kincaid asks for the impossible: a stillness that will not stop, 
and a “way” that can only be traveled in the travails of language, 
voiced in a rhetorical question that does not know whether it ques-
tions, affirms, or denies: “only the impossible can make me still: 
can a way be found to make what happened not have happened?” 
(32). There is no solution here, no analysis that that can assuage 
Kincaid’s paralyses. The cherished name “antigua”—translation, 
misnomer, and erasure of the proper—is the postcolonial allegory 
of this quest for selfhood, defying the claims of the explorer and 
tourist yet unclaimed by Kincaid herself, whose countervoyage is 
too aware of its fateful entanglement not to persist in demanding 
the impossible.
Transgressions
French literature forms the basis of this study of paralyzed travel, 
which spans a period from the early nineteenth century to the post-
colonial present. as shown by our examples from Beckett and Kin-
caid, however, paralyses of travel are not limited to the French context. 
and yet it is in this context, and particularly in French modernity, 
that the critique of travel and paralytic transports becomes a cultur-
ally dominant motif. Moreover, French modernity provides both 
the most striking symptoms of paralysis and their most insightful 
critical theories. The French example serves here, then, both as a 
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singular case and as an example with which to compare other cultural 
instances of travel’s paralyses. This raises an interesting problem 
of cultural comparison and translation, however. If translation in 
its classical sense implies the transfer of meaning across cultural 
codes, such transfers and transports are called into question by 
travel’s paralyses. as mode of cultural translation, paralysis dwells 
on the untranslated: that which does not cross borders, that which 
does not carry over. This is not to imply, however, that paralyses 
simply impede communication and reinforce cultural closure and 
singularity. rather, paralyses prevent the facile transfer of mean-
ings at the expense of language’s figural thickets. It is, indeed, in 
the thickets of language that one reads the symptom as “a failure 
of translation,” to borrow Freud’s expression.58 extending Freud’s 
notion of the symptom to a cultural level, one may speak of cultural 
“failures of translation” that bring travel to a halt. Far from remaining 
unmoved and static, however, the “to-be-translated,” as laplanche 
puts it, is the core of the desire to understand, communicate, and 
travel (259). The “to-be-translated” is, in this sense, the very source 
of the “drive to translate” (164), even if that source itself remains 
unmoved and untranslated.59
a diagnosis of the specifically French cultural motif of paralysis 
is provided by the spanish critic José Ortega y Gasset in his 1925 
The Dehumanization of Art, an early assessment and theorization 
of modernism. Ortega calls the novel “a sluggish genre” that, in his 
account, tends toward an increasing diminution of action, story, 
and adventure in favor of the exploration of literary form, character, 
and psychology.60 Conrad might be cited as a key instance of this 
development; a hinge figure in literary modernism, Conrad exploits 
the resources of traditional adventure tales but tends to stall his 
journeys in reflexive psychological meditations.61 For Ortega, Proust 
is the last great example, though an extreme one, of the modern 
novel’s sluggishness. “so slowly does the action move,” Ortega says 
of Proust, “that it seems more like a sequence of ecstatic stillnesses 
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without progression” (Dehumanization of Art, 79). Indeed, in what 
he calls Proust’s “paralytic novel” (87), “the permissible measure of 
slowness is overstepped” (80). some amount of action is necessary 
to narrative, though Ortega approves its near-abolition in favor of 
hermetic formalism and psychological analysis. Ortega’s modernist 
manifesto thus contrasts the French tradition, including the rigor 
of its classicism—as in the conversing “statues” of racine’s plays 
(73)—to the popular tradition of spanish literature, still wedded in 
his time to models of chivalry, adventure, and the picaresque.
The rejection of adventure and the picaresque is a common thread 
in modern French literature, which voices an ironic doubt as to nar-
ratives of escape, adventure, and discovery. One may argue, further, 
that the breakdown of plot and narrative characteristic of modern 
literature corresponds to the demise of overarching spatiotemporal 
narrative structures modeled on travel, adventure, and conquest. 
This allows us to trace a longer genealogy to what lyotard, in his 
celebrated formulation of 1979, calls postmodernism’s “incredulity 
toward metanarratives.” as lyotard says, “the narrative function 
is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voy-
ages, its great goal.”62 The political reasons for this rejection are 
lacking, however, in Ortega’s analysis, though it betrays throughout 
a suspicion of mass culture and popular forms of literature. at the 
other end of the political spectrum, Michael Nerlich’s Ideology of 
Adventure offers more pointed political reasons to critique the tradi-
tion of adventure. Nerlich argues that Western adventure narratives 
were born in a transitional historical stage between feudalism and 
early capitalism, spain being a main context for this historic shift. 
Having lost his role within the feudal system, the knight’s purpose 
was glorified in narratives that emphasized honor and romance. 
Interestingly, however, the rise of the tale of chivalry coincides with 
the obsolescence of the knight, serving as an ideological mask for 
his decreased social status in an increasingly mercantile and capital-
ist world. Taken up in turn by the rising merchant class, adventure 
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similarly justified and masked the political role of the capitalist 
through the glorification of financial risk and adventure. and since 
profit negates the very risks undertaken in capitalist travel, it is only 
in promoting an ideology of risk that narratives of adventure, like 
the discourse of speculator, investor, and merchant, justify their 
profitable returns. Heroic adventure, in Nerlich’s analysis, is thus the 
mere alibi of this closed economy, whose aim, in fact, is “to remove 
adventure as far as possible from any incalculable risk.”63 Nerlich’s 
historical approach allows us to see how the decline of adventure 
in modern literature may be a symptom of the breakdown of bour-
geois confidence in its historical mission. This doubt dominates in 
the literature of the nineteenth century, though the ideology of 
adventure persisted in popular media, just as it does today in the 
touristic discourse of so-called “adventure travel.”64
Claude simon’s great war novel The Flanders Road provides a late 
instance of the demise of chivalry and adventure. Interestingly, in so 
doing the novel also contrasts the two cultural traditions of spain 
and France. Horsemanship, horseracing, and the French cavalry 
are dominant themes in simon’s novel, whose story weaves back 
and forth between the history of an aristocratic officer, routed in 
the Napoleonic war with spain, and the experience of the narra-
tor, a soldier in the French cavalry in World War II. The retreat 
from spain, remembered in the context of World War II, allows 
simon to embroider a vast historical tapestry, from the origins of 
French literature in La Chanson de Roland up to the recent past. 
The narrative comprises a series of shifting and repeated tableaus 
that are strikingly static; the text insists on the immobility of all 
the soldiers’ actions, as in the description of “the four riders and 
the five horses somnambulistic and not advancing but lifting and 
setting down their hooves almost motionless on the road.”65 The 
book’s emblematic image is that of a dead horse lying in the mud, 
repeatedly invoked as frozen in motion or petrified like a fossil: 
“it seemed to have been there forever, like one of those fossilized 
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animals or plants that had returned to the mineral kingdom, with 
its two front feet bent into a foetal posture of prayer” (26). This 
static and frozen figure connects the narrator’s obsessive memories, 
though it cannot be located in a determinate time in the narrative. 
Indeed, the dead horse seems to fall outside of time in a kind of 
infinite acceleration, “as if the margin of time normally necessary 
for the passage from one kingdom to the other (from the animal to 
the mineral) had this time been crossed at once” (104). It remains 
for us to determine how and why such a paralyzed image coincides 
with a sudden passage and crossing.
The originality of simon’s novel lies in its insistence on a time 
that is not so much historical as geological. Indeed, all seems pet-
rified or frozen in the novel, caught in the imperceptible move-
ment of a glacier, “that Olympian and cold progression, that slow 
glacier moving since the beginning of time” (Flanders Road, 284). 
Time, conceived as a glacial substance containing all the novel’s 
characters and events, suspends chronology and causality to offer 
instead a web of episodes linked not in a single temporal chain 
but rather as static elements in a contemporaneous frozen space. 
This bold narrative gambit of an impersonal glacial and geological 
time nonetheless betrays recognizably psychological obsessions and 
conventional narrative structures: “I the horseman the booted con-
queror coming from the depths of time coming to seduce to carry 
off the lily-white princess” (272). This seduction, moreover, bears 
the traits of a Freudian family romance; the mother of Georges, 
the protagonist, hails from an aristocratic lineage, and Georges, 
in seducing the wife of his aristocratic officer, seems to flirt with 
incest and defy his father’s peasant lineage. Georges’s paralyses can 
then be ascribed to a neurotic fixation that sustains both his desire 
and its prohibition in images of frozen motion. This ambivalence 
also marks the novel’s relationship to the adventurous narratives it 
aims to challenge and dismantle. In this respect, then, Georges—
and simon himself—would be similar to Georges’s mother, who is 
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“animated by contradictory sentiments, probably uncertain herself 
if in narrating these scandalous, or ridiculous, or ignominious, or 
Cornelian stories she wanted to deprecate that nobility, that title 
she had not inherited, or on the contrary give it more luster, so as 
to further gorge her pride with the consanguinity and the glamour 
reflected from it” (58). The reference to Corneille, appropriately 
enough, refers us to that classic tale of spanish chivalry, El Cid. 
But in taking leave of such literary history, simon’s novel betrays 
an anxiety of influence that paralyzes his narrative. This ambivalent 
tension reaches a climax in the elaborate scenes of lovemaking at 
the end of the novel. The woman’s body is identified with all that 
is earthly, mineral, and geological; a misogynist fantasy thus lays 
the blame for corruption and death in the fatal desire “to return to 
the moist and secret hiding place, the dark mouth” of his lover’s sex 
(296). We have seen how the frozen image of the dead horse also 
invokes a sudden “passage” into another realm. Petrified and time-
less, and yet suddenly crossing over a limit, the dead horse shares 
with Georges a similar paralyzed motion in the act of lovemaking, 
as he indulges in fantasies of guilty transgression. Women and the 
earth are insistently compared in such figures as “the matrix of pale 
ochre earth” (161), and the “ancient matrix” (221). Thus, Georges is 
described as “paralyzed with cramps, and as motionless as the dead 
nag, his face buried in the thick grass, the hairy earth, his whole 
body flattened as if he were trying to vanish between the lips of 
the ditch, to melt, to slip, to sink altogether through the narrow 
crevice to rejoin the original matter (matrix)” (249). Here, sex and 
desire seem to give way to Freud’s death drive. I will return, in what 
follows, to this key notion in Freudian theory. Here let me briefly 
indicate that simon’s approach to the death drive resembles Freud’s 
in its speculative delirium, as well as in its attempt to encompass a 
negativity that reaches beyond narrative and structure. But if the 
death drive opens onto sheer negativity and the loss of meaning, a 
compensatory move usually allays the costs; in simon’s novel, that 
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move would be a grounding of meaning in a mythic feminizing of 
the work of destruction: “[B]ut what could you call that: not war not 
the classical destruction or extermination of one of the two armies 
but rather the disappearance the absorption by the primal nothing-
ness or the primal all of what a week before were still regiments 
batteries squadrons of men, or better still: the disappearance of the 
very notion of a regiment a battery a squadron of men, or better still: 
the disappearance of any notion of any concept at all” (305).
What transports remain when the main thrust of narrative is 
seemingly abandoned, as we see here? What subjects replace the 
hero, adventurer, and conqueror? In simon’s case, the avant-gardism 
of his prose subtly perpetuates chivalry in the very dismantling of 
its literary codes; in this sense it is akin to all adventure tales that, 
as Nerlich argues, are inherently belated and anachronistic. I have 
argued, further, that a Freudian account of the text serves as a key 
to the narrator’s paralyses. In what follows, I will further develop 
the stakes of a Freudian critique to show how modern literature’s 
discourse of adventure is inflected away from the conventional 
domain of adventurous plot and action and toward psychic risk, 
rebellion, and transgression.
In an account of the demise of adventure in Western literature, 
Paul Zweig’s The Adventurer argues for a rehabilitation of the adven-
turous hero, understood as an indispensable figure who dramatizes 
the defining boundaries of the social order through transgression 
and risk. Zweig’s modern exemplar of such a hero is Nietszche, 
whose transgressive philosophy rejects the bad conscience of the 
criminal in favor of the overman. Zweig’s celebration of adventure 
in literature fails to account, though, for what remains normative 
in such tales of masculine risk, discovery, and monstrosity. Inter-
estingly, Zweig’s first invocation of risk goes by way of paralysis: 
“Haven’t all of us, now and then, experienced moments of abrupt 
intensity, when our lives seemed paralyzed by risk?”66 This paralysis 
may well evoke the moment of suspense before action; it also points, 
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however, to a breakdown of transport, a hesitation at the place 
of transgression. I would suggest that such paralyzed transgres-
sion can be approached through psychoanalysis, which offers some 
of the richest accounts of the paradoxes of transport. In contrast 
to Zweig’s hero, the psychoanalytic subject would be that other 
criminal whose desire, in its byways and displacements, confronts 
the motivating and paralyzing force of prohibition. Neurotic travel 
reveals the structuring role of an internalized prohibition that the 
subject vainly attempts to circumvent. as the subject’s alibi, travel, 
then, may be the scene of a failed reflexive turn; within the modern 
adventurer lies the ironic figure of a rat Man, whose obsessions, 
fixations, and frenetic wanderings are so many frustrated attempts 
to bring to light his compromised desiring motives.67 The reflexive 
turn away from adventure and toward the everyday is a hallmark 
of modernism and the Nouveau roman; in sarraute’s early work, 
the emotional transports of her characters are reduced to minimal 
“tropisms” in a stifling atmosphere of anxiety and claustropho-
bia.68 In its characteristic reflexivity, modern literature shares with 
psychoanalysis a suspicion of travel, or what Paul Morand calls the 
“délit de fuite” (“hit and run”; literally “crime of flight”), and the 
breakdown of heroic narrative confirms literature’s quest for other 
transports, at the cost of paralysis.69
From conquistadors and chivalry to the modern cavalry, it is a 
small step to the corrida, belated holdover of an ideal of masculine 
heroism. Here again we find a paralyzed transgression, such as stands 
at the beginning of Michel leiris’s autobiographical project. Despite 
its promising title, leiris’s Manhood (L’Age d’homme) is no account of 
heroism, except in suggesting an impossible ideal: that of the matador 
to which the author aspires in his poetics of risk. as stated in the 
essay that opens the autobiography, leiris aims at exposing himself 
to a “danger” analogous to that of the bull’s horn by submitting 
himself to an absolutely truthful self-portrait.70 leiris notes that his 
writing is intended as an “act” of confession inspired by the experi-
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ence of a prior psychoanalytic treatment. This act, however, tends 
irresistibly toward paralysis, since the “sculptural” model to which 
leiris aspires is that of a matador whose “feet remain motionless,” 
controlling the passing bull with his cape (161). Further, leiris says 
that he wants his autobiography to present him as a “solid block” in 
protection against death—adding that, paradoxically enough, this 
contradicts his own intention to “risk everything” (162). This crucial 
equivocation between self-constitution and absolute risk, unresolved 
by leiris, points to a crisis of identity at the site of transgression, a 
crisis marked by castration anxiety, tellingly evoked by the threatening 
horn of the bull. Dedicated to his friend Georges Bataille, leiris’s 
Manhood bears the stamp of his friend’s Nietzschian philosophy of 
transgression, and thus seems to confirm Zweig’s argument; and 
yet, leiris’s examples of the corrida and sacred ritual fall more fully 
within the scope of a psychoanalytic predicament. Here, transgres-
sion conveys nothing so much as the compromised status of neurotic 
desire, both sustained and inhibited by a reigning prohibition. Thus, 
the matador, as embodiment of a ritualized transgression, is seen as 
submitting to a rule of conduct with respect to the dangerous bull. 
There is “an immediate connection between obedience to the rule 
and the danger incurred,” leiris notes (160). Indeed, the rule, “far 
from being a protection, contributes to his danger.” The rule, then, 
submits to another imperative, that of the symbolic law conveyed 
by the phallic horn. leiris’s paralysis in the face of this threatening 
law is the price of his wayward, transgressive desire.
another way of approaching the paralytic aspect of leiris’s work 
would be by means of the register of identification and desire that 
Jacques lacan terms the Imaginary. as the primary mode of the 
subject’s identification, the Imaginary initially serves to stabilize 
the infant as a specular ego in resistance to its bodily disorganiza-
tion. lacan emphasizes the inertia, fixation, and resistance that 
characterize the specular ego in its “formal stagnation,” a stasis 
akin to the face of an actor in a film that has been stopped.71 In the 
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adult subject the persistence of the Imaginary represents above all 
a vain effort of self-constitution in resistance to the symbolic law 
of castration. leiris’s frustrated writings and travels would thus 
be structured and limited within the scope of an impossible and 
illusory effort of self-realization. It is worth recalling that lacan 
defines egoical identity as an aspect of the subject that is intractable 
and permanent. While defined by a moment of development lacan 
isolates as a “stage,” the mirror stage is not one that is overcome, 
but is incorporated within the subject and in lacan’s discourse in 
an increasingly complex structuring network, overlapping and in-
terfering with the symbolic and the real. at the same time, if this 
Imaginary regime that “fixates” the subject is irreducible, it contains 
within its own dynamic the seeds of its own dismantling. This is 
the topic of lacan’s essay “aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” where 
he highlights the frustrating nature of the ego and the characteristic 
violence it fosters. like Freud, lacan considers aggression against 
others to be determined by an original aggressivity toward oneself. 
lacan refines this point by tying its logic to “a primary identifica-
tion that structures the subject as a rival with himself.”72 accord-
ingly, aggressivity, in lacan’s analysis, is fundamentally aggressivity 
turned against the specular ego; the ego, in its frustrations, is seen 
as undertaking the destruction of its own claims to integrity—
such as leiris’s “single solid block”—and ultimately aiming beyond 
the Imaginary. In this account, then, Freud’s primary narcissism 
is directed less at defense and self-constitution than toward the 
very overcoming of its illusions. lacan thus parts company with 
Freudian ego psychology, which makes the ego the very core of 
the well-adjusted individual. In contrast, lacan states that egoical 
frustration and aggression point the way to the emergence of the 
subject in the place of the ego. This self-realization is undertaken by 
means of the death drive, whose tireless work compels the subject 
to dismantle its cherished illusions. leiris’s “autocritique” can be 
usefully situated within this problematic, and the symptoms of 
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leiris’s masochism may be located at this primordial level, where 
the work of self-reflection and autobiography is directed at the de-
molition of the image of selfhood. accordingly, a crucial feature 
of leiris’s travel accounts is their self-deflating presentation of his 
imaginary desires and motives. I examine leiris’s work and travels 
in chapter 1, where I compare him with two precursors, Nerval 
and Gautier, and more at length in chapter 4, where I examine his 
ethnographic travels.
Psychoanalysis thus provides a means to reconsider the topos 
of imaginary travel, usefully recast as a phantasmatic domain of 
vexed identification, rivalry, and frustrated transports. In his Pros-
pero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, Octave Mannoni 
addressed the imaginary motives for traveling to underdeveloped 
countries: “Baudelaire felt, as we all do, that savage countries and 
savage peoples were the nearest imitation he could find in the real 
world of that of his childhood—of paradise. We may go further and 
say, with but slight exaggeration, that there would be no ethnog-
raphers, explorers, or colonials ‘among the savages’ if it were not 
for this vocation.” Mannoni links this vocation to a fundamental 
ambivalence that plays out in the colonial drama: “civilised man is 
painfully divided between the desire to ‘correct’ the ‘errors’ of the 
savages and the desire to identify himself with them in his search for 
some lost paradise.”73 What accounts for this ambivalence, and how 
does it serve to motivate the traveler? Mannoni’s formulations here 
provide the elements of a lacanian analysis. The traveler’s picture of 
the native would be framed in the Imaginary, that register of desire 
in which the subject projects the illusory figments of an impossible 
plenitude by means of mirroring relationships with images of the 
self and others. This specular resolution is purchased at a great cost 
to the subject, however, as the ironic consequence of the subject’s 
imaginary strivings for identity is to see itself only as an other. The 
ego is thus constituted as a relationship to a field of projections that 
the self cannot fully assume; for this reason, lacan says, the ego is 
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“frustration in its essence.” all imaginary relations are as a result 
structured by an unresolvable dynamic of identification and rivalry 
as the subject struggles with the terms of his specular alienation. 
Mannoni points to such a dynamic when he asserts that the trav-
eler is painfully divided by the desire to “identify” with the primi-
tive and to impose himself on him. The alter ego is always prey to 
such violent alteration by the egoic subject due to the aggressivity 
inherent to his specular frustration.74 With its focus on the case of 
French Madagascar, Mannoni’s Prospero and Caliban provides me 
with some of the terms with which I approach the work of Jean 
Paulhan in chapter 3. In close readings of Paulhan’s work, including 
his linguistic study of Malagasy proverbs, I underscore characteristic 
turns and reversals that bear persistently on a dynamic of mastery 
and submission. Paulhan’s linguistic studies in Madagascar thus 
symptomatically enact a problematic of subjection, in which questions 
of agency and authority vie with intractable doubts and anxiety. 
These vexing figures of uncertain agency defy accountability, and 
as a result, Paulhan’s cultural estrangement and dislocation yields 
no clear narrative but only paralyses and paradoxical transports.
Insofar as the traveler follows the vectors of an imaginary desire, his 
travels will be marked, then, by a defining frustration. Psychoanalysis 
thus provides useful terms for a political critique of imaginary travel. 
One might, for instance, recast Dean MacCannell’s well-known 
sociological study of tourism in lacanian terms. If, as MacCan-
nell puts it, the tourist’s journey is “a search for authenticity,” his 
travel is, however, fundamentally nostalgic and illusory, sustained 
by figments of stereotyped elsewheres and others.75 Frustration 
habitually accompanies the quest for authenticity, which misrecog-
nizes its true purpose, Jonathan Culler points out, as “a quest for 
an experience of signs.”76 The habitual resentment by the tourist 
of other tourists could be attributed to specular rivalry, and the 
friction between the tourist’s cherished illusions and the awkward 
mediation of his experience could be cast as a struggle between the 
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Imaginary and the symbolic. Moreover, imaginary travel allows us 
to see how touristic travel can survive, and even sustain itself, in its 
very nostalgia and belatedness; the traveler’s disenchantment—and 
even his failure—can console him in his illusions. We have seen 
how “imperialist nostalgia” stakes its claim to lost authenticity in a 
loss it perpetuates and dissimulates. similarly, imaginary travel lays 
hold of images and stereotypes whose frustrating nature fosters an 
evermore imperious fixation. This is captured in Malek alloula’s 
catalogue of colonial algerian postcards.77 The postcards document 
the power of the stereotype in authorizing French claims for colo-
nial domination, exposing in a striking way the role of the sexual 
phantasm in the discursive hegemony of colonial rule. a victory 
of the gaze, such postcards disavow their own frustrated access to 
women who remained in large part out of reach and sight of the 
French colonial.78 In chapter 2, I explore this ambiguous colonial 
fascination in Fromentin’s rapturous description of an algerian 
harem, and argue that Fromentin’s algerian journeys demonstrate 
the belated traveler’s jealous hold on colonial illusions.
Psychoanalysis also presents novel insights into one of the most 
time-honored examples of paralyzed travel: Zeno’s arguments on 
the impossibility of movement. several recent lacanian essays have 
turned their attention to Zeno’s paradoxes, the best known of which 
represents achilles in pursuit of a tortoise. Zeno’s argument purports 
to demonstrate that although achilles is faster than the tortoise he 
will be forever unable to catch up to it. since the tortoise has an 
advance on him, the argument goes, achilles must make up first the 
distance between them, plus the advance. This advance, however 
short, becomes infinite in Zeno’s argument, for once a given distance 
is covered, an advance always remains, which itself becomes a dis-
tance to cover, and so on. The prey thus infinitely recedes in smaller 
and smaller increments. slavoj Zižek points out that psychoanalysis 
allows us to recognize in this seeming sophistry what is in fact the 
most common of experiences, namely the dream of running in 
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place.79 Zeno’s paradox thus holds true at an unconscious level of 
experience. What the tortoise would represent, in this analysis, is the 
subject’s goal: not any particular object but the object as such, whose 
promise of infinite satisfaction provokes its infinite regress. Zižek’s 
argument concerning Zeno draws on the lacanian notion of the 
objet petit a. In an important scene from Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, the child conjures up an object that would cover over the 
absence provoked by the mother’s departure. lacan’s reading of 
Freud asserts that the absence bears less on the mother herself than 
on the child’s identity; out of the child’s sense of lack he precipitates 
an object—the ego—with which his integrity can be assumed. This 
object lacan terms the objet petit a, an object that the child attempts 
to recover but which, paradoxically, was not there to begin with. 
This object is inversely figured in the mirror stage, where the child 
anticipates an identity in the form of an image that his body cannot 
yet correspond to. The imaginary object thus exists within a tem-
porality that cannot coincide with the subject: on the one hand, an 
impossible nostalgia posits retroactively what must have been; on the 
other, a dream of fulfillment to come conjures up a future perfect, 
what will have been. as cause of desire, the imaginary object propels 
the subject in a quest for what cannot be attained.
a second paradox of Zeno’s posits that an arrow in flight is motion-
less. since at any point in its trajectory it must occupy a certain space, 
it is claimed to be perpetually at rest. The logic of both paradoxes 
relies on the principle of cutting up motion into increments. Joan 
Copjec ties this logic to the rationale that leads aristotle, in his theses 
on movement, to posit the Prime Mover, an immobile agent at the 
heart of any motion. What dictates that the identity of the arrow 
or the substance of a given being must interrupt its own motion? 
In Copjec’s analysis, it is the primal cut between the Imaginary 
and the symbolic that accompanies the subject’s every move and 
threatens him with paralysis even as it causes his very flight. “The 
subject constructed by language finds itself detached from a part 
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of itself. and it is this primary detachment that renders fruitless all 
the subject’s efforts for a reunion with its complete being. The arc 
of its strivings appears to the subject as Zeno’s arrow—an endlessly 
interrupted flight that can only asymptotically approach its goal.”80 
lacan adds to Zeno’s paradox of achilles and the tortoise the clari-
fication that the subject (achilles) may well be able to overtake the 
object (the tortoise), he simply cannot attain it. The most obscure 
moment of the paradox thus becomes that of the limit point where 
the subject crosses over or crosses out the place of the object: a point 
of coincidence without contact, a point of presence without present. 
“Clearly,” lacan says, “achilles can only overtake the tortoise, he 
cannot catch up with her. He rejoins her only in infinity.”81 Copjec 
ties this question of infinite regression to the problematic of the 
signifier. In a linguistic order founded on difference, the infinite 
deferral of meaning, how, she asks, can the sign ever reach a point 
where meaning can coincide with the sign? Copjec suggests that 
the limit that suspends these alternatives is the subject’s finitude, 
the incompletion that precipitates the subject’s impossible object of 
desire. This finitude motivates the subject; the cause of his actions 
originates in an impasse whose overcoming is the impossible object. 
In Milner’s words, Zeno shows that “the impossible is necessary.”82 
The solution to the paradox lies with the limit: it is because the 
subject is finite or castrated that the limit is overcome, not once and 
for all but endlessly. Copjec says, “The psychoanalytical subject is 
not infinite, it is finite, and it is this limit that causes the infinity, 
or unsatisfiability, of its desire. One thing comes to be substituted 
for another in an endless chain only because the subject is cut off 
from that essential thing that would complete it.”83 a recognition 
of this unsatisfiability would be, then, the condition for an ethics 
of traveling desire. ethical transports, renouncing the imperious 
image and its objects, would be modeled on the Freudian drive, a 
sheer impulse without object but its own tireless quest.
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as Copjec’s essay makes clear, her lacanian analysis of the para-
doxes of transport aims to rebut a deconstructive theory of linguistic 
difference. Derrida’s critique of lacan involves a challenge to the 
theory of the symbolic as structuring linguistic order, with castration 
and transgression as its linchpins. even among lacan’s dissenters, 
including many of his feminist critics, castration, transgression, 
and the law provide orienting terms for a questioning of symbolic 
norms and their social instantiations. Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Freud and lacan disorients these terms in a radical way. There is, as 
a result, a hint of anxiety in Copjec’s invocation of an unstructured 
infinity, whose limiting cut, for all its painful consequences, offers 
a structuring reassurance. Indeed, her very argument with Derrida 
betrays a structuring reflex of opposition, one that, moreover, pits 
infinity against its contrary. However, Derrida’s analysis of the limit 
does not itself posit the infinite Copjec would attribute to him. 
Neither finitude nor infinity, Derrida’s limit poses the problem of 
an aporia more paralyzing than lacanian theory, and more para-
doxical even than Zeno.
among Derrida’s most searching inquiries into the figures of 
transport is his essay on Freud’s death drive, where he suggests 
the name paralyse for the critique he undertakes.84 Freud’s meta-
psychological Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with its focus on death, 
finitude, and the “beyond,” allows Derrida to question the role of 
the limit in Freudian thought. This limit is Freud’s very topic—the 
limit of life—but as Derrida shows, it is also the limit of Freud’s 
own discourse as it comes up against its unthought margins and 
boundaries. Derrida thus displaces the question as Freud poses it, 
to show how the text’s unworking of its argument stages its own 
death-work at the limits of knowledge. Derrida emphasizes the 
erratic, stumbling, and wayward progress of Freud’s argument, 
his démarche, underscoring how Freud’s textual tarrying with the 
limit entails a fruitful paralysis. Metaphysical and spiritual figure 
par excellence, the notion of the “beyond” is significantly critiqued 
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in Freud’s own analysis, but it is only his inadvertent stumblings 
and paralyses that constitute a deconstruction of that notion. The 
value of Freud’s inquiry lies, therefore, not so much in his theory of 
a purported biological death drive as in its enacting of a “destruction 
drive,” the persistent undoing of the text’s own argument.
Derrida thus finds Freud an ally in the deconstruction of death 
as theme or dialectical negation. Death as the radically other, Der-
rida argues, cannot be appropriated or set to work by the dialectic; 
its otherness is not opposed to life or the pleasure principle, nor is 
it sublated in a movement that transcends that opposition. simi-
larly, in an essay on Blanchot, Derrida reduces the movement at 
the limit to the mere step or “trace” of a “pas”: a step beyond that 
is simultaneously the negation of that same step. The grand pathos 
of Bataille’s theory of sacrifice and the grim negativity of Blanchot 
amount as a result to a mere pun. Derrida is careful to caution, 
however, that such a pun risks being mistaken as mere voluntary 
play or, as in Freud, a successful, if momentary, transgression of the 
censoring law.85 The duplicity of the “pas” (step/not) aims instead to 
convey, in a pairing of nonopposed contraries, the differential stroke 
that inscribes otherness within any given sign. likewise, Derrida’s 
witty and punning intervention into Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle aims not to make light of the death drive, but to bring 
out, in Freud’s own inquiry, what resists death’s appropriation as 
theme or telos. Death is not dialectical otherness and negation; it is, 
instead, a paralyzing confrontation with a minimal limit that, always 
already crossed, binds the sign to its duplicitous other. Derrida’s 
“pas” conveys this play of otherness and iteration that confounds 
any account of presence, paralyzing both writer and reader in their 
encounter with its paradoxical trace.
In Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks has named the theory of the 
death drive as “Freud’s masterplot.”86 It is noteworthy that in using 
Freud’s text for his narratological purposes, Brooks’s focus is on 
nineteenth-century literature, and not on more-modern fictions—
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such as Claude simon’s, for instance—that dismantle and problema-
tize the arc of conventional narrative. Moreover, Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle is not so much a plot as a tangle of fits and starts, 
of retractions and reversals. reading for the plod, so to speak, we 
bring out paralyses in Freud more akin to the texts surveyed here: 
the trudging fictions of Beckett, the wayward self-scrutiny of leiris, 
the drifting of Barthes. To catch the drift of Barthes’s texts is to read 
desire in its paradoxical transports, in tropisms and paralyses that 
belie narrative order. as I show in chapter 5, Barthes’s early Mytholo-
gies took to task the political, ideological, and colonial economies of 
travel and tourism as expressed in the popular media of the France 
of the 1950s. subsequently, Barthes theorizes other transports that 
go by the names of dérive and atopie. such transports reflect a turn 
in Barthes’s work, begun with s/z, toward the theorization of sexu-
ality, pleasure, and desire. s/z also marks Barthes’s departure from 
the structuralist paradigm, and his espousal of paradoxical trans-
ports carries him away from structural models of sexual identity, 
plot, and narrative. This proves a significant means of challenging 
gender norms as embedded in traditional narrative and plot, and 
as perpetuated in narrative theory.87 One of Barthes’s tactics in the 
face of such normative sexual roles is to redistribute them along the 
lines of gender. Thus, pointing to the convention that “Woman is 
sedentary, Man hunts, journeys,” Barthes claims the privilege of 
the former: “sedentary, motionless, at hand, in expectation, nailed 
to the spot, in suspense [en souffrance].”88 This paralysis defines the 
principal role of the lover in A Lover’s Discourse as one who suffers 
the absence of the other: “in any man who utters the other’s absence 
something feminine is declared: this man who waits and who suffers 
from his waiting is miraculously feminized. a man is not feminized 
because he is inverted but because he is in love” (14). Barthes’s 
appropriation of a conventional topos of amorous narrative thus 
yields a queer alternative to its sexual essentialism and elaborates 
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an ethics of desire that refuses the spoils of romantic adventure and 
chivalrous conquest.
Barthes’s suspicion of travel in A Lover’s Discourse entails a rejec-
tion of narrative, to the extent that the latter is wed to motives that 
would deny or attenuate the force of a desire aiming beyond ends, 
needs, and morals. Paralysis and fragmentation, as opposed to the 
language of mastery and adventure, nonetheless allow for other 
forms of transport. The language of absence provides for a space 
of play, a rhythm of attachment and separation. a frequent model 
of such transports for Barthes is the fort-da game from Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, by which the child mimes the comings and go-
ings of his mother. Barthes is close to lacan in taking this scene 
as exemplifying the force of the drive in its impossible relation to a 
forever absent object. Indeed, Barthes specifically adopts the term 
dérive (drift) from lacan to name the paradoxical transports of desire. 
Unlike lacan, however, Barthes holds to dérive and its relation to the 
maternal object in resistance to the symbolic as such. Barthes thus 
departs from the psychoanalytic critics we have surveyed so far, and 
attempts to reclaim the Imaginary as an alternative to the norma-
tive constraints of social and sexual identification. This alternative 
ultimately entails a rehabilitation of imaginary travel as an ethical 
relation in which the subject makes room for his atopic desire as the 
space of his necessary illusions and queer transports.
Barthes launches the challenge of such atopic transports in s/z: 
“What would be the narrative of a journey,” Barthes asks, “in which 
it was said that one stays somewhere without having arrived, that 
one travels without having departed—in which it was never said 
that, having departed, one arrives or fails to arrive?”89 Barthes’s 
impossible journey and its paradoxical transports resonate with 
all those explored in this book. as we will see in the next chapter, 
such an impossible journey is highly evocative of the spatiotem-
poral complexities of the immigrant experience. It also speaks to 
the nightmare of marginality and discrimination as described by 
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Boudjedra, the focus of my final chapter. Barthes’s analysis thus 
not only can inform atopic pleasures and drifts but also contribute 
to a political critique of the exclusion of sans-papiers and migrants 
from the dominant narratives of travel. such insights are enabled 
in part by cultural and political criticism, as seen in Mythologies, but 
also, more significantly, by the paralyzed reading in s/z, a patient, 
exhaustive, “slow motion” and “step-by-step” approach (12). Neither 
arriving nor failing to arrive, as Barthes has it, the transports of such 
reading are a pleasurable dérive. at stake in this drift, once again, is 
the figure of an aporetic boundary, a rive—“shore” or “bank”—that 
defies access. Barthes’s paradoxical drift thus accords with Derrida’s 
in “Pas”: “What arrives would always arrive at the border. affecting 
the border. But by remaining there: by not arriving.”90 Neither 
movement nor stasis, the “non-arrivé” is an impossible arrival at 
each and every step.91 at the same time, however, the “non-arrival” 
is promising, as it suggests not only paralysis but also transports, 
translations, and destinations still to come. For the rive or border 
is also a crossroads; here at this crossroads we will meet the arrivant, 
the twin and reversible figure of the colonist and immigrant, each 
paralyzed by the legacy of modern French travel.
at the end of Sentimental Education, Flaubert gives a summary 
indictment of bourgeois travel: “He travelled. . . . He returned.”92 
One hundred years later, Barthes’s s/z offers a similarly telegraphic 
synopsis: “To depart/to travel/to arrive/to stay: the journey is satu-
rated” (105). Between the two and stretching beyond into a wider 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernity, French literary cul-
ture expresses a pervasive mistrust of travel. One might call this a 
dominant literary discourse against travel, akin to the modern French 
denigration of vision studied by Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes. Un-
like Jay’s, however, my own approach aims not at a comprehensive 
cultural history, and does not claim to fully represent even a literary 
history of the period. In this respect, I share Jay’s own qualifications 
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regarding the limitations of “discourse” as an organizing principle 
of cultural historiography. Jay quotes from James Clifford on this 
point: “Discourse analysis is always in a sense, unfair to authors. 
It is interested not in what they have to say or feel as subjects, but is 
concerned merely with statements as related to other statements in 
a field.”93 a similar problem arises when treating travel as unitary 
theme or motif; Clifford’s work, eminently sensitive to travel’s com-
plexities, has pursued the seemingly contradictory, but more precisely 
oxymoronic and paralyzing implications of “traveling cultures” and 
“dwelling-in-travel.”94 likewise, to avoid the risk of overgeneralizing 
claims and illusory themes, in what follows I pursue close readings 
of the work of a select number of authors; a sustained focus on their 
texts brings out the particular lineaments of their paralyses within 
a discursive context they evoke, contest, and alter. It is, in fact, only 
from a synoptic perspective—such as that of Flaubert and Barthes 
above—or by means of selective quotes and broad themes, that one 
could make the claim for a simple, consistent, or uniform modern 
French negation of travel. a closer, slower approach reveals that 
paralyses are always challenges not to travel as such but to the norms 
and constraints of travel and translation. In this sense, the critique 
of travel is a “counter-discourse,” as richard Terdiman defines it; 
not simply the discourse of antagonism and resistance, but a more 
imbricated contestation within the dominant order.95 Paralyses, as 
distinct from critique, would occupy the very site of this imbrication: 
between discourse and counterdiscourse; between the colonizer’s 
vision and the recognition of the other; between touristic mentality 
and the experience of alterity. Given the omnipresence of figures of 
transport in language, the vexations of paralyzed speech threaten 
all the terms by which we represent our motions, emotions, mo-
tives, and meanings. as a result, language too becomes the site of 
contestation, its powerfully freighted metaphors paralyzed by poetic 
insight into more problematic turns of speech. even at their most 
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stymied, however, paralyzed travels always speak to new mobilities, 
and it is to a more detailed study of such paradoxical transports that 
we will turn next.
Having opened this introduction with a discussion of Beckett’s 
paralyzed travels, I will index in closing a late manuscript of his titled 
“The Way.” Beckett accompanied his drafts of this brief, unfinished, 
and unpublished text with the image of a figure eight, alternately 
drawn upright and horizontal. each image figures a “winding one-
way way,” the path of a perpetual circuit. “The one way back was 
on and on was always back.”96 The cover of this book is indebted to 
Beckett’s simple and evocative image that conveys a journey both 
infinite and infinitely stymied. Beckett’s “Way” may serve as a map 
to the chapters that follow.
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